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Cooperatives have been used as examples of successful collective action ac-
tivities. However, member free riding within cooperatives and other collective ac-
tion groups continues to be a challenge. The board of directors and management
of United Producers Inc. confronted the member free riding issue when creating
a restructuring plan after their Chapter 11 bankruptcy ﬁling. The plan integrated
three strategies which have been proposed to mitigate free riding in large groups;
coercion, a federated organizational structure, and selective incentives. This article
compares Mancur Olson’s theoretical framework for addressing free riding behav-
ior with United Producers Inc. restructuring plan.
Introduction
United Producers Inc. (UPI) is a livestock marketing cooperative headquartered
in Columbus, Ohio and has approximately 45,000 members. The cooperative owns
and operates 42 facilities in Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky, and Michi-
gan that serve as sites for weekly livestock auctions, collection points, and direct
movement of livestock. It provides local market outlets for approximately 3 million
head of beef cattle, dairy cattle, replacement heifers, hogs, sheep, and goats. The
cooperative also provides farmers access to price risk management and production
consulting services, and maintains a direct producer loan portfolio of over US$50
million through Producers Credit Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary.
UPI was created in September 1999 through a merger of Producers Livestock
Association (PLA) and Missouri Farmers Association (MFA) Livestock Associa-
tion. The original parent cooperative, Producers Livestock Credit Association, was
formed in 1932 to provide ﬁnancing to farmers and ranchers for operating expenses
and the purchase of breeding and feeder livestock. PLA was formed in 1934 as
a marketing cooperative, and Producers Livestock Credit Corporation became its
subsidiary.
Dennis Bolling became PLA’s president and chief executive ofﬁcer in 1989, and
quickly realized that the cooperative needed to grow geographically and increase its
market presence to remain a viable organization. PLA was involved in a high vol-
ume, low margin segment of the livestock industry. The livestock industry, as well
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as the structure of the marketing system, was changing rapidly. The meat packing
sector of the industry was consolidating and seeking reliable access to larger lots
of livestock with consistent quality attributes. This initiated a transition towards an
increased use of marketing and production contracts, as well as put pressure on the
traditional marketing channels to streamline operations.
The merger of PLA and MFA Livestock Association allowed the newly cre-
ated UPI to expand and diversify geographically, increase its membership base, and
expand the services offered to members. One important position taken within the
merger process was that UPI would not own livestock directly, but rather would
serve as a marketing outlet, provide risk management and consulting services, and
supply needed ﬁnancing for livestock producers.
In early 2000, Interstate Producers Livestock Association (IPLA), based in Peo-
ria, Illinois, approached UPI to explore the potential of a second merger. UPI began
relations with IPLA through a management agreement concerning IPLA facilities.
The resulting operations suggested that a merger of the two organizations would
not create the efﬁciencies desired by UPI. Instead, UPI chose to purchase selected
assets from IPLA rather than pursue a full merger. This allowed UPI to once again
expand its membership base and geographic reach without taking on under-utilized
assets. It also allowed UPI to expand its hog contracting division.
In June 2000, UPI began discussions with Southern States Cooperative (SSC)
to operate the latter’s livestock marketing division. In 1998, SSC merged with UPI-
competitor Michigan Livestock Exchange, which had facilities in Michigan, Indi-
ana, Ohio, and Kentucky. UPI leased selected assets from SSC in December 2000
before purchasing them in early 2001.
Inapproximately18months,UPIhaddoubleditssize,signiﬁcantlyincreasedits
geographic coverage, and expanded its membership base. The core business strat-
egy was working, but the expansion pace was greater than expected.
The George Young and Kathleen McConnell Fraud Problems
Before the merger of PLA and MFA Livestock Association, the latter passively
owned 75 percent of MFA Livestock Services, LLC (limited liability company).
Professional Business Services, Inc. (PBS), jointly owned by George Young and
Kathleen McConnell, owned the remaining 25 percent and was the managing entity
of the LLC. After the merger that created UPI, the name of the LLC was changed
to United Livestock Services, LLC. UPI remained a passive investor and was not
involvedinUnitedLivestockServices’regularbusinessoperations.InAugust2001,
PBS closed abruptly and subsequently ﬁled for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.
Young and McConnell had been involved in ﬁctitious transactions and had cer-
tiﬁed to their clients and lenders that their business owned 343,000 head of cattle,132 Journal of Cooperatives
when in reality the business owned only 17,000 head. The scheme collapsed in
2001 when cattle prices declined and loan payments came due. Young and Mc-
Connell were indicted on several changes of fraud. They later pleaded guilty to
these charges and cooperated with government agencies that were investigating the
activities. The scheme cost individual investors approximately US$147 million and
lenders approximately US$36 million. Approximately US$16 million was recov-
ered through the sale of PBS assets and distributed to the fraud victims (United
States of America v. Young 2005).
As a result of their passive ownership interests, UPI sustained losses from un-
paid cattle sales to the LLC, as well as the basic investment losses. Furthermore,
UPI was named in several subsequent lawsuits that claimed it should be held ac-
countable for Young and McConnell’s actions, even though UPI was but a passive
partner and sustained its own losses due to the fraudulent activities. Attempts were
made to settle the lawsuits out of court to save litigation costs, even though there
was little legal grounding for the claims. However, these attempts failed. The le-
gal expenses for ﬁghting current and pending lawsuits were growing rapidly and
placing a ﬁnancial strain on UPI. In April 2005, the decision was made to ﬁle for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy to protect the cooperative’s remaining assets and allow time
to reorganize.
The Reorganization Plan
After the decision was made to ﬁle for bankruptcy, the board of directors and
senior management were confronted with the challenge of simultaneously main-
taining business operations and developing a reorganization plan. A major effort
was also made to keep employees informed about the source of the problems and
the steps being taken to address the issues. UPI members were updated on a regular
basis through newsletters and direct mailings, with extra attention paid to former
MFA Livestock Association members who may have been directly or indirectly
affected by the fraud activities.
UPIhadbeenworkingcloselywithCoBank,itsprimarylender,andthebankruptcy
court to ensure that regular business dealings with farmers would proceed smoothly
immediately after the initial bankruptcy ﬁling. However, how would the member-
ship respond to the news of the Chapter 11 ﬁling? Would members continue to
patronize the cooperative, especially given that a large percentage of the current
patrons had become members of UPI as a result of the preceding mergers and ac-
quisitions? The ﬁrst critical week of operations after the bankruptcy ﬁling went
better than expected and there was little change in gross business volume.
The next major step was to develop a restructuring plan. There were three cen-
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is UPI a viable business entity if the legal issues can be resolved successfully; 2)
what should UPI look like after the reorganization; and 3) how can the company
rebuild its equity base?
Both an internal review and an external evaluation by a business-consulting ﬁrm
indicated that UPI’s core business would still be viable if the legal issues were suc-
cessfully resolved. The next question concerned the structure of the business. A
wide range of ideas were considered and a variety of business models were eval-
uated. This included converting to a corporation, a limited liability company, an
employee-owned ﬁrm, a new generation cooperative, or maintaining the existing
Section 521 cooperative status.
There was little doubt in the minds of the board of directors and senior manage-
ment that the current membership base placed “value on the cooperative’s presence
in the marketplace,” and that members were asking themselves what would happen
if UPI were not there.1 Feedback indicated that members recognized the value that
UPI created through its ability to serve local needs and provide a competitive outlet
for their livestock. Therefore, a decision was made to retain the existing cooper-
ative structure, but reevaluate the cooperative’s bylaws and membership policies.
What changes could be made to members’ rights and responsibilities to rebuild the
cooperative’s equity base?
Conceptual Framework: Cooperatives as a Form of Collective
Action
Agricultural cooperatives have often been cited as examples of successful col-
lective action efforts (Olson 1965; Staatz 1987; Hansmann 1996; Holmstrom 1999).
Farmers and ranchers have utilized a wide variety of bargaining associations and
alternative cooperative business structures in an attempt to create mutual and/or
shared beneﬁts. Although cooperative business objectives can and do vary, one
frequently cited objective is to function as a competitive yardstick (Nourse 1922;
LeVay 1983; Sexton 1986; Staatz 1987).
Producers Livestock Association, the parent cooperative of UPI, was origi-
nally formed to “provide livestock producers access to competitive markets” (In re
United Producers, Inc. 2005). This objective continues today and is consistent with
the competitive yardstick motivation for organizing cooperatives, as introduced by
Nourse (1922). Nourse argued that a cooperative’s primary function is to act as a
competitive yardstick and ensure that local markets for agricultural inputs and pro-
duction remain as close to a perfectly competitive market as possible. Under this
rationale, the competitive pressure from the cooperative eliminates any potential
economic rents from the local market. More competitive local markets are one ex-
ample of the beneﬁts from collective action with public goods attributes. They are134 Journal of Cooperatives
non-rivalrous in consumption, difﬁcult to exclude, and the beneﬁts accrue directly
to the individual rather than accumulate at the organizational level and re-distribute
to members.
However, the public goods nature of more competitive local markets combined
with the voluntary open membership policies of most cooperative business struc-
tures makes the free rider problem a signiﬁcant issue for many cooperatives (Staatz
1987; Cook 1995). As local markets become more competitive, there is less in-
centive for individuals to patronize and/or invest in the cooperative. If a signiﬁcant
number of the cooperative’s patrons switch their dealings to competing ﬁrms, the
viability of the cooperative may be jeopardized.
Confronting the Free Rider Problem
Olson (1965) is credited with initiating a paradigm shift in the study of the
challenges facing collective action organizations. Olson argued that group beneﬁts
that are difﬁcult or impossible to exclude allow individuals to access these beneﬁts,
even though they have not contributed their proportional or appropriate share of the
resources needed to supply the beneﬁts. And, if an individual decides to contribute
resources, everyone within the group would share any additional beneﬁts resulting
from these contributions. These combined conditions create weak direct incentives
for individuals to contribute required resources towards group action, or provide
individuals an incentive to free ride on the contributions of others.
Olson (1965) went on to argue that the dynamics within large groups were dif-
ferent from those of small groups. In small groups, a greater portion of the total
group beneﬁts is available to each individual, it is easier for group members to ob-
serve and/or detect changes in resource contributions relative to a large group, and
it is less expensive to organize and coordinate the activities of a small group.
However, large collective action groups face a different set of conditions. In
large groups, a very small portion of the total group beneﬁts go to each member,
and it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to detect when a group member alters their
resource contributions or stops contributing. The costs of creating a large group are
also greater than those for a small group. As a result, it is either very difﬁcult or, at
times, impossible for large collective action groups to organize and/or sustain the
provision of difﬁcult to exclude collective beneﬁts.
Olson (1965) proposed three general strategies for mobilizing large collective
action groups: 1) coercion; 2) a federated organizational structure; and 3) selective
incentives. Coercion refers to a required or mandated contribution that could be
administered by an external force, like the state, or internally by the organization. A
common example of coercion within agriculture is the mandatory check-off process
used by many commodity organizations for general market promotion and research
activities.Vol. 23[2009] 135
A federated organizational structure divides a large group into smaller sub-
groups, which increases the visibility of individual actions and enables the sub-
groups to use social inducements to enhance participation. Many agricultural coop-
eratives, commodity groups, general farm organizations, and civic groups utilize a
federated structure to keep local chapters or sub-groups small while still capturing
potential economies of scale at the larger state, regional, or national levels.
Selective incentives include additional or supplemental incentives used to re-
ward collaboration or punish non-collaboration, and target individuals who do not
work towards the common interests of the group.2 Olson (1965) provided two ex-
amples for the general concept of selective incentives. The ﬁrst are social incentives
available to small groups, such as prestige, respect, and friendship. These incentives
are especially viable for small groups because of the close interaction of the partic-
ipants. Social incentives are less effective for large groups because it is difﬁcult for
each member to know all other members.
The second example is “by-product” beneﬁts used by large lobbying organiza-
tions or professional associations. The by-product theory points to a “joint offering
or ‘tied sale’ of a collective and noncollective good that could stimulate a rational
individual in a large group to bear part of the cost of obtaining a collective good.”
(Olson 1965, pg. 134). In this instance, a separate excludable private good is offered
as a reward for contributing resources towards the supply of the non-excludable
collective good. One speciﬁc example is access to a trade magazine or professional
journal as a reward for paying membership dues to an association that emphasizes
lobbying activities.
The Joint Products Model
Cornes and Sandler (1984; 1994) provided a model of consumer behavior that
captures the concepts contained in the by-product theory. Within this model, an in-
dividual has a choice between purchasing either a pure private good or a commodity
that generates a dual output (i.e., a public good output and a private good output).
The purchase of this second commodity results in a joint product. This model is a
generalization of the basic public goods model that contains a single pure public
good and a single private good.
The joint products model integrates two attributes important for private collec-
tive action organizations like cooperatives. First, an individual’s contribution to-
wards the provision of a collective good can provide joint products in the form of a
private good output and a pure public good output. Second, the individual’s utility
maximizing decision is still dependent upon the actions of others because the total
provision of the public good results from the combined contributions of many indi-
viduals. The interdependence in the supply of the public good, then, is maintained.136 Journal of Cooperatives
The free rider problem continues to be a concern because an individual can still ac-
cess the public good output without contributing appropriate resources. However,
given the assumptions of the model, the presence of joint products does enhance the
provision of resources and mitigates the inﬂuence of free riding.
ThejointproductsmodelhassimilarcharacteristicstoOlson’s(1965)by-product
theory. The broader by-product theory proposes tying access to a private good with
resource contributions needed to supply non-excludable collective goods. The more
speciﬁc joint products model suggests that an individual’s purchases or resource
contributions will simultaneously generate a public good and private good output.
The key difference seems to be the underlying assumptions regarding the produc-
tion relationship between the collective good and the private good.
Multiple Beneﬁts Available to UPI Members
Attributes from both the joint products model and Olson’s (1965) propositions
for large groups can be found in adjustments made to UPI’s bylaws and member-
ship policies. First, there are multiple member beneﬁts realized from UPI’s business
activities. Some of these are analogous to pure public goods, such as more compet-
itive local markets for livestock, while others are private goods. Even these private
goods can be separated into those that accrue directly to a speciﬁc individual mem-
ber, such as reduced transportation costs through delivery to local receiving stations
rather than delivery to competing facilities farther away, and those that accrue at
the cooperative level, such as the margins gained by pooling deliveries from several
producers to create larger lots that can be supplied to a processor at a premium.
The cooperative level beneﬁts are retained by the cooperative for a time and then
returned to members based upon a measure of patronage.
Access to private beneﬁts that are either joint and/or tied to a beneﬁt with pub-
lic goods attributes can provide an incentive great enough to encourage member
patronage and resource contributions. Peterson (1992) demonstrated this by pre-
senting a net cash ﬂow investment analysis framework and decision making rules
for member investment in cooperatives. Peterson argued that both the cash ﬂows
generated from the cooperative’s assets (e.g., patronage allocations) and the cash
ﬂows from farm assets as a result of doing business with the cooperative must be
included when estimating the total value from cooperative membership. The dis-
counted value of the combined cooperative membership cash ﬂows are compared
to the discounted cash ﬂows from an investment in other assets plus the farm level
cash ﬂow as a result of patronizing a non-cooperative ﬁrm. If the combined cash
ﬂows from cooperative patronage and investment are greater than the combined
cash ﬂows from non-cooperative patronage and other investment alternatives, an
individual will have an economic incentive to become a cooperative member.Vol. 23[2009] 137
However, this framework does not distinguish between member level beneﬁts
that are unique to the individual (a private beneﬁt) and those that have public goods
attributes and are available to everyone. Individuals may or may not place full value
on those beneﬁts that have public goods attributes.
Adjustments to Member Rights and Responsibilities
Two major changes were made to the existing set of UPI member rights and
responsibilities. The ﬁrst was the addition of a per unit capital retain for every head
of livestock sold through one of UPI’s auction facilities or receiving stations. A per
unit capital retain is a ﬁxed fee that is withheld from the sales check as a member’s
contribution to the cooperative’s equity capital. A US$0.75/head capital retain for
cattle, US$0.25/head for swine, sheep, and goats, and US$0.50 head for any other
species marketed was incorporated. This equity contribution does not bear interest
or receive a dividend. After a ﬁve-year period, retained equity, both per unit capital
retains and allocated retained net income, is returned to the member at book value
on a revolving basis.3 An upper limit of US$2,500 per member (U.S. dollars) was
also included on total accumulated retained investment at any time during the ﬁve-
year period.
The accumulation of per unit capital retains, in addition to the existing policy
of allocation and distribution of annual cooperative net income, increased the level
of available equity capital and provided the opportunity to rebuild UPI’s ﬁnancial
base.Thiscanalsobeviewedasaformofcoercion(enforcedbythecooperative),as
Olson (1965) proposed. If a farmer or rancher sells livestock through one of UPI’s
facilities, a portion of the sales price is automatically withheld as a contribution to
equity. The member does not have the discretion to determine how much will be
withheld or when it will be redeemed.
The second major change introduced a second class of membership called a pre-
ferred member (as opposed to a general member). To become a preferred member,
a producer must pay an annual US$20 preferred membership fee.4 Preferred mem-
bership allows access to: 1) a discount on tariff schedules at auction facilities; 2)
direct, or non-auction, marketing services; and 3) management and consulting ser-
vices, risk management services, producer training and certiﬁcation, and ﬁnancial
services. Additional fees are charged to perform the marketing, management, and
training services, but they are only available to preferred members. The preferred
membership fee is automatically subtracted from the ﬁrst livestock sales check of
the year. If a producer does not want to be a preferred member, they must formally
request a refund.
This is an example of linking resource contributions used to create group ben-
eﬁts (e.g., preferred membership fee and minimum sales volume) with access to138 Journal of Cooperatives
private beneﬁts (e.g., discounted tariff fees, direct marketing and related services).
InitiatingtheannualUS$20preferredmembershipfeeforeachoftheapproximately
45,000 members generates an additional US$900,000 in gross revenue.
Voting rights within UPI are also limited to preferred members who have mar-
keted a minimum of 20 head per ﬁscal year through the cooperative. Eligible mem-
bers can elect and serve as district delegates, who are the legal voting members
of the cooperative. The district delegates, who represent deﬁned trade areas, have
the authority to elect the cooperative’s board of directors and vote on changes to
the cooperative’s articles of incorporation and bylaws. Both district delegates and
the board of directors serve three-year revolving terms and maintain a one vote per
member policy.
This district voting structure establishes a federated voting conﬁguration. So,
while UPI does not have a formal federated business structure, where individuals
are members of independent cooperatives, which are, in turn, members of a larger
federated cooperative, there is a federated representation system.
An Emerging Program
In late 2008, UPI introduced a pilot intuitive in Michigan called the Commu-
nity Markets program. This program allows a member to invest directly through
preferred stock in their local auction facility to improve facilities, reduce debt, and
provide a working capital buffer for the local facility. In return, the member gains
the opportunity to receive dividends on the preferred stock that accrue from the fa-
cility’s proﬁts and beneﬁt from the enhanced efﬁciency of their local auction. This
program initiates an alternative form of federated structure. The member can di-
rectly invest in the speciﬁc local auction facility that will generate the greatest indi-
vidual member beneﬁts rather than invest in the parent cooperative as an integrated
entity.
The Community Markets program is still under development and has not yet
been fully implemented. However, the concept is an important component of UPI’s
long-term strategy, and will be expanded to other states if successful in Michigan.
Conclusions
Although there were initial concerns about member response to instituting per
unit capital retains and a preferred membership structure, the changes did not gen-
erate a signiﬁcant amount of negative feedback. UPI has been able to rebuild the
member equity base and enhance member commitment to the cooperative. The
Chapter 11 reorganization progressed rapidly and was approved by the bankruptcy
court, without the assignment of a creditors committee, approximately six months
after the initial ﬁling. The outstanding legal proceedings were eventually droppedVol. 23[2009] 139
and UPI was neither connected to nor held accountable for the actions of Young
and McConnell.
The two major changes to membership rights and responsibilities are consistent
with the conceptual framework discussed above. First, combining per unit capital
retains and patronage allocations diversiﬁes the equity sources for the cooperative
and ensures that each patron contributes some equity capital towards the provision
of group beneﬁts. Second, preferred membership links access to private beneﬁts
with essential resources needed by the cooperative, and these resource contributions
simultaneously produce both public and private beneﬁts to members. While the
linkageofresourcecontributionswithaccesstoprivatebeneﬁtsdoesnotcompletely
eliminate the incentive to free ride in the provision of collective beneﬁts, it does
signiﬁcantly reduce free riding activities.
In addition, the district delegate voting system and the pilot Community Mar-
kets program introduce elements of a federated structure. These are intended to
strengthen the tie to the local facility while offering an ability to capture economies
of scale from a larger cooperative organization.
The challenge facing UPI’s board of directors and senior management was to
continue to provide their members access to competitive local markets and desired
services while creating appropriate incentives for members to provide essential re-
sources needed by the cooperative. This challenge is shared by many cooperatives
around the world. The recognition that cooperatives can be a successful form of
collective action with multiple member beneﬁts created, with both public and pri-
vate goods attributes, may provide insights into the design and implementation of
member rights and responsibilities that provide stronger incentives for participation
and contribution.
Notes
1. Personal correspondence with Dennis Bolling, president and CEO of United Producers,
Inc.
2. Selective incentives were deﬁned as “an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately,
like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather selectively toward the indi-
viduals in the group. The incentive must be ‘selective’ so that those who do not join the
organization working for the group’s interest, or in other ways contribute to the attainment
of the group’s interest, can be treated differently from those who do.” (Olson 1965, pg. 51,
emphasis in original).
3. According to UPI’s bylaws, the only time that per unit capital retains and retained allo-
cated patronage are not returned at book value is when net business losses are in excess of
the unallocated reserves and member equity is required to offset the loss.
4. The preferred membership fee was recently increased to US$35 per year.140 Journal of Cooperatives
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